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This paper outlines some of the historical and epistemological themes of al-
Risālat al-Kāmiliyya fī al-Sīrat al-Nabawiyya (‘the Epistle of Kāmil on the life-story 
of the Prophet’; henceforth, Risālat Kāmiliyya) by Ibn al-Nafīs (d. 1288) in the 
context of discussions about testimony in Medieval Islamicate intellectual 
milieus. The paper is divided into three parts. 
The first one will offer a brief description of the place of testimony in Medieval 
epistemic discussions, with some comparative elements. The second part 
presents a short summary of Risālat Kāmiliyya’s close precedent, Ibn Ṭufayl’s 
Risālat Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, with some remarks on the role of testimony in its 
epistemology. In the third part, Risālat Kāmiliyya’s original epistemic stance on 
testimony will be examined and discussed, with some proposals about its 
historical and philosophical significance. 
 
To Carola, thank you for all the curry. 
 
1. Testimony and transmission in Medieval Islam 
Testimony is defined (Strawson 1994, Fricker 1994) as the acquisition of valid knowledge through words 
from an external source. 
It is common experience that testimony represents a basic source of a large portion of anyone’s 
knowledge; furthermore, it operates as an essential feature of any kind of known culture. In 
particular, testimony underpins socialized knowledge; knowledge obtained through other means such 
as perception or inference would remain confined within the consciousness of the individual 
performing them, unless their awareness can be conveyed through intelligible words or other shared 
symbolic means.1 The epistemic status of testimony among the instruments of knowledge has been a 
long-term focus of intellectual discussions in several cultures.2 
A distinction of three main instruments of knowledge (the pramānas of Indian thought) 
amounting to perception, (inferential) reasoning and testimony respectively is found in different 
                                                             
 
1 “In order to recognise the distinctiveness of testimony one should start with the obvious point that we acquire 
testimonial knowledge through communication” (Faulkner 2000: 587). 
2 See Freschi in this volume. 
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cultural contexts; in India, most traditions of thought discussed these (pratyakṣa, anumāna and śabda3 
in Sanskrit, respectively) as the major pramānas. Likewise, Islamic theological and philosophical 
discussions from the ninth century onwards frequently offered a general tripartite division of sense 
perception (ḥiss), rational inquiry or speculation (naẓar) and report (ḫabar; Wisnovsky 2004: 66-67).4 
These fundamental typologies may be expanded or reduced.  
In contemporary Western epistemology, testimony as means of knowledge is contrasted with 
empirical perception, inference through independent reflection, and memory (Fricker 1995, Faulkner 
2000). The Indian Nyāya school counted upamāna, rendered as ‘comparison,’ as a pramāna (this may 
recall qiyās ‘analogy’ in Arabic grammar and Islamic law)5. Other Indian traditions distinguished other 
more specific pramānas. However, upamāna and similar types may be seen as secondary and reducible 
to more broadly defined notions of ‘reason’ and ‘inference;’ memory may be construed as a 
repository, providing knowledge that had been previously perceived, deduced or received as a report. 
Therefore, perception, reason and testimony can be proposed to be the principal available 
instruments to acquire knowledge in the context of the present discussion, although this assertion 
would be incomplete under other aspects.6 
Some traditions of thought have not considered testimony as independent instrument of 
knowledge. This is the case of Vaiśeṣika in India. Platonic and Aristotelian schools, which, in this 
regard, inspired many strains of Modern “Western” philosophy, tend to focus on intellectual, 
universal knowledge, accomplished by individuals through reasoning, particularly syllogistic, 
abstract reasoning. In general, the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition thus regards insights from sense 
perception and testimony as a necessary preliminary step to universal, “scientific” abstract 
knowledge based on rigorous rational reasoning, rather than constituting knowledge in themselves. 
                                                             
 
3 Śabda conveys a broader meaning than “testimony”; in some philosophical schools, the role of language is 
emphasised over that of the witness. Here I am using “testimony” as roughly equivalent to śabda, as knowledge 
transmitted through words. See Freschi in this volume.  
4 See below. 
5 Qiyās means ‘syllogism’ in other contexts. Generally, it may be defined as a heuristic procedure of reducing an 
unknown or abnormal phenomenon to known categories. See below. 
6  Ibn Sīnā’s reading of Aristotelian epistemology discusses memory (ḏikr) and ‘experience’ (tağriba) as 
intermediate modes of knowledge between pure sense perception and intellection. See Janssens (2004). 




Interestingly, disciplines closely tied to word-transmitted cognition, such as grammar and 
history, receive relatively little epistemic attention in Aristotle’s works.7 Aristotle also goes as far as 
denying that perception is a source of ‘scientific’ knowledge;8 while sense perception has a role in his 
epistemology, the Aristotelian approach regards knowledge (ἐπιστήμη, epistḗme; ʽilm in Arabic) as 
inherently universal.9 In this view, perception and testimony only convey awareness of particular 
things; therefore, they both take a secondary role.  
A roughly comparable attitude to testimony exists among reductionist modern philosophers; 
while there is little question about testimony’s instrumental role, they argue that it does not make an 
independent instrument for knowledge. Nevertheless, while a thorough epistemological discussion of 
testimony is, in general, a relatively recent feature of “Western” philosophical thought, the presence 
of testimony in the set of epistemic tools of “Western” philosophers is long established (Fricker 1994, 
Mohanty 1994, Faulkner 2000, Adler 2012, Freschi in this volume). Even Aristotle’s writings often 
begin discussions on any given topic with a reference and review of previously transmitted opinions 
about it (although he does not appear to concede that this by itself provides knowledge); furthermore, 
Aristotle's corpus notoriously lies at the root of an extensive commentary tradition, whose cognitive 
enterprise thus features instances of testimony. 
For the purposes of this article, it is sufficient to take that testimony may be an instrument of 
knowledge in practice, and that it constitutes a basic type alongside perception and reason, without 
question of either its further epistemic reducibility or independence. 
The assessment of the reliability of transmitted information represents an important social task, 
in everyday life as well as philosophical discussion. Cultures and intellectual traditions differ in their 
epistemic strategies to define and assess the role of testimony.  
The following remarks are generalizations that should not be taken as an exhaustive description 
of the epistemic options existing within the Medieval Islamicate high culture. Their main purpose is 
rather to provide an expanded frame of reference for the analysis of the complex epistemology of 
                                                             
 
7 “Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history: for poetry tends to express the 
universal, history the particular.” Poetics, 9, trans. S. H. Butcher. See also Faulkner (2000) and Adler (2012). 
However, history and grammar were not, overall, neglected fields in the Greek Aristotelian tradition as a whole.  
8 “Scientific knowledge is not possible through the act of perception.” Posterior Analytics, I, 31, trans. G. Mure. 
This must be put into perspective by more nuanced views stated by Aristotle elsewhere and the broader context 
of Aristotelian epistemology. 
9 Adamson (2005) illustrates this point clearly, also clarifying the reception of this aspect of Aristotelian 
epistemology in the Arabic philosophical tradition. See also McGinnis (2003, 2007). 
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testimony featured, according to my analysis, in Risālat Kāmiliyya. Accordingly, I will focus on the 
epistemology of testimony in the Aristotelian philosophical traditions in Arabic, without delving into 
the related debate in natural philosophy on the epistemic value of experience and induction.10 I will 
relate these epistemic discussions to aspects of mainstream Sunni theology and law, but this is not 
the place to discuss them in full. Likewise, the rich traditions of thought connected with Shi'ism and 
other relevant schools of thought such as the Ẓāhirites, or the lively Sufi discussions about the 
possibility to apprehend God directly, cannot be detailed here. 
 
1.1. Islamic epistemic debates 
In this section, I describe some dimensions within the epistemological debates shaping the Islamicate 
Medieval intellectual space with regard to testimony, in the context of the wider discussion that 
hinged on the relative place of rational, independent thinking and revealed, transmitted word in the 
overall social system of knowledge.  
It is important to stress that these discussions did not usually create unbridgeable oppositions of 
mutually exclusive epistemic alternatives; I rather see a tension among different ideas about the 
appropriate balance between poles, which competed for epistemic primacy as bases for a socially 
viable body of knowledge.  
The general epistemic attitude of the Medieval Islamicate culture may be described as “a 
genealogical conception of knowledge.”11 Tracing the sources and the chain of transmission of a given 
statement or discourse usually played a key role in defining its validity. This pattern is based on the 
study of ḥadīṯ, the reports of sayings and deeds attributed to the Prophet Muḥammad, which emerged 
as a central element in the theological and political debates of the eighth and ninth centuries AD. 
Fabricated stories about the Prophet and the first generations of Muslim believers circulated in order 
to support theological or political positions; defining criteria and hierarchies of authoritativeness and 
authenticity became critical as the general epistemic validity of the ḥadīṯ was recognized. Some 
scholars devoted their whole life to examine hundreds of thousands of circulating sayings, in order to 
detect and preserve the authentic ones. The main criteria to do so were, in general, extrinsic, 
referring to the context in which the testimony had been delivered, involving examination of 
reliability in the transmission. A given statement was usually accepted as authentic on the 
                                                             
 
10 See McGinnis (2003, 2011). 
11 “Una concezione genealogica del sapere”. Capezzone (1998: 27; my translation). 




trustworthiness of each link in its attached chain of transmitters (isnād), with limited regard for its 
content (matn). This procedure extended beyond the critical analysis of sayings and deeds of the 
Prophet and came to be applied in many areas of knowledge, although with significant variations.  
A transmitted statement whose validity is under consideration, normally composed of isnād and 
matn, is generally called a ḫabar (pl. aḫbār; in Modern Arabic, ‘news’), a ‘report,’ or a ḥadīṯ (pl. aḥādīṯ) 
‘tale;’ the latter term is used mostly but not uniquely for Prophetic reports. The standard form of a 
ḫabar is often story-like, as “Zayd told me that ʽUmar reported he was sitting playing chess with 
Aḥmad who told him his tale about Zaynab,” thus frequently providing a context for the utterance of 
the statement reported. A ḫabar could then expand into a full story, or collection thereof. It is worth 
noting that isnād and ḫabar feature in the technical jargon of Arabic classical grammar as the two 
main ways to refer to grammatical predication, highlighting a possible link between report-based 
epistemology and linguistic analysis of logic and grammar (Lancioni 1991). 
In traditional study of the Prophetic ḥadīṯ corpus, critical review of isnād grounds the reliability 
of single reports; an isnād may include a link that is not considered trustworthy, or may be rejected, 
for example, if it is known that two successive transmitters could not possibly have met. In general, 
reports that are known through multiple isnād chains that show no weakness such as unlikely 
meetings or known liars are considered the most secure and their authenticity is normally accepted. 
Many reports however have to rely upon one chain of transmission only. These traditions may be 
held to be valid, unless they have other defects, but are often considered somewhat less authoritative 
than the ones reported by several independent sources. This is in accord with the trend of classical 
Islamic legal practice to require more than one witness for valid proof; however, requirements are 
usually stricter in law than in the study of ḥadīṯ. In principle, there is no limit on the length of the 
chain of transmitters, provided that it has no gaps or unreliable witnesses in it.  
The validity of information, especially normative information, in religion and law is thus 
normally based upon the traceability of its transmission to authoritative individuals, whose 
definition is close to the one of the Sanskrit āpta: competent in the matter, willing to convey 
knowledge and truthful in what is said.12 
In a sense, classical Arabic literature could be described as an effort to organize, refer and 
systematize the whole corpus of (secular) aḫbār at its disposal in a coherent and useful frame. 
Narratives are frequently presented as reported rather than invented fiction, exemplary tales 
referred to identifiable (albeit fictional) sources (Drory 1994). The frame-tales such as the Arabian 
                                                             
 
12 See the contributions of Freschi and Rostalska in this volume. 
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Nights exemplify this attitude (Kilito 1992, chapter 2). Thus, Medieval Arabic prose at large features a 
distinct educational and cognitive purpose, that also appears in the works considered here. 
A defining point of contention in the formative discussions of Islamic law and theology was the 
role, if any, that independent, individual opinion (ra’y; epistemically close to ‘inference’) should have 
in relation to reported information (ḥadīṯ). A hierarchy of the sources of religious knowledge was set 
out by Wāṣil ibn ‘Aṭā’, an early theologian who lived in Iraq in the first half of the eighth century, as 
follows (Van Ess 2008: 106-107): 
• The Qur'an, whenever its meaning is clear. 
• Tradition (aḫbār) attested by several independent and reliable sources. 
• Tradition attested by one source only, provided the source is reliable.  
• Qualified use of reason (‘aql). 
 
This epistemic hierarchy reflects the important place assigned to testimony as a shared 
patrimony of the community. Likewise, the hierarchy of the “foundations of law” (uṣūl al-fiqh, 
sometimes less accurately rendered as “sources of law”) upon which legal rulings were based came to 
be generally settled in this basic order:  
• The Qur'an (reliable by definition). 
• The ḥadīṯ corpus.  
• The consensus or general agreement (iğmā‘) of the competent people (usually scholars). 
• The analogical reasoning (qiyās) whereas the result of three above uṣūl is applied to new cases 
based on resemblance.13 
 
Sunni scholars tended to avoid the explicit incorporation of personal opinion (ra’y) and reason 
(ʽaql) among the uṣūl. There was fear that this would have divisive consequences for the community 
of believers; thus, in principle (not always in practice) the scope of reasoning in law was limited to 
the relatively restricted application of precedent-based qiyās.  
Consensus became the overarching concern, as the validity of the ḥadīṯ was in turn established, 
in part, through it. Acceptance of the Qur’an’s authoritativeness was underpinned by the general 
                                                             
 
13  As a comparative note, in Classical Indian law according to the texts of the Dharmaśāstra corpus, the sources 
of law are: 1) the Vedas. 2) The tradition (smṛti) that is the texts based on the Vedas. 3) The custom of those who 
know the Vedas. 4) Individual judgement (sometimes translated as ‘pleasure’) of educated people. 
The parallel with the Classical Islamic approach is striking and may deserve further analysis.  




agreement of all Muslims.14 In epistemic terms, one could consider the Qur’an a token of testimonial 
knowledge attested to those living after Muhammad by many independent sources although, to 
Muslims, its epistemic value is rooted in its divine origin, not in its social transmission.15 
Throughout a large portion of Islamic intellectual history, however, theological, legal and even 
literary discussions relied on textual proof (naṣṣ) from either the Book or the ḥadīṯ heavily, in 
preference to individual reason or sense perception (Rosenthal 2007: 93 ff.). This form of textual 
knowledge has a social value marked by its testimonial character (Faulkner 2000).  
The wide-ranging reception of Greek philosophical thought into the Islamicate intellectual space 
through translations and original works in Arabic fostered a tradition of thought known as falsafa, 
‘philosophy’ in the Aristotelian-Platonic mode. Falsafa emphasized an intellectualist, ‘individualist’ 
epistemology oriented toward rigorously demonstrated, personally reached universal knowledge 
(ḥikma, ‘wisdom’ or ‘philosophy’; ‘ilm, ‘science’). Islamic intellectual life thus experienced an 
epistemic polarity between the intellect or reason (‘aql) and transmission or tradition (naql; 
Capezzone 1998: 79, Wisnovsky 2009). After the eleventh century, the reception of Ibn Sīnā's (known 
as Avicenna in the West; d. 1037) vast philosophical work molded the terms of this epistemic debate 
(Wisnovsky 2005). 
In the scientific and philosophical fields, a divide between ‘traditional’ (naqlī) and ‘reason-based’ 
(‘aqlī) disciplines (‘ulūm, sg. ‘ilm 'science'), grounded in their epistemological and historical status, 
came to be widely accepted; the different impact of reliably transmitted knowledge in the 
epistemological foundations of these groups of sciences was among the factors differentiating them, 
since traditional sciences depend much more on the importance of testimony. 
This division tended to overlap with the division between ‘Arabic’ and ‘Foreign’ or ‘Ancient’ 
sciences, with the former roughly corresponding to the traditional ones.  
We should not overstate, however, the rift between reason and transmission. “Rational” 
disciplines, which included logic, the mathematical disciplines, and various branches of natural 
philosophy, did not abandon the authoritativeness of transmission, relying on knowledge and 
commentary from the Greek translated texts. In theoretical matters there was, as will be shown, an 
emphasis on individual intellection. On the other hand, in more practically oriented disciplines such 
as medicine and politics the accepted, transmitted views were regarded as a valid epistemic tool, 
alongside experience extracted from sense perception through abstraction. These would provide 
                                                             
 
14  See also Gilliot (2007). 
15  See also Hallaq (2009, chapter 2). 
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needed information about particulars that are outside the grasp of rational, universal intellection.16 
Nevertheless, philosophers did not regard these particular insights, useful they might be, as knowledge 
in themselves (Adamson 2005). 
Conversely, ‘traditional’ and ‘Arabic’ sciences like theology, law and grammar had room for 
independent inquiry based on reason; grammar and theology, in particular, quickly incorporated 
logic and other aspects of Greco-Arabic intellectual toolkit, especially after the tenth century.  
A prominent representative of falsafa, al-Fārābī (d. 950 AD), developed a classification of sciences 
which was oriented by a topic-driven, ordered pedagogical progression, rather than the more 
common epistemic-historical one (Capezzone 1998: 90.).17  
Philosophers held inferential syllogism (qiyās) their central intellectual tool, conducive to 
certain (yaqīn) knowledge, namely universal knowledge, through a process of independent ‘inference’ 
that required specific training (Black 2006). Like Aristotle, al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā recognized the 
possibility to use data from experience (repeated, abstracted perception in controlled condition) as 
premises of syllogistic reasoning offering a qualified form of certainty.  
Most Muslim philosophers, particularly Ibn Sīnā and his disciples, followed Aristotle in 
considering knowing something an actualization of its form in the intellect, in a sense becoming like 
it.18 Ibn Sīnā argued for a direct, non-discursive intellectual apprehension or “taste” (ḥads) of 
universal truths, to be juxtaposed to and contrasted with the logical, cogitative progression to it 
(Adamson 2004, Black 2013, Ivry 2012, Gutas 2014: 213 ff.). This epistemology stressed the personal 
role of the individual in receiving intellection, which according to Ibn Sīnā is the apprehension of a 
pre-existing supra-sensible Form, that the mind can usually access after appropriate preparation 
through the exercise of reason. 
This philosophical stance, giving preeminence to intellect and individual reason, generally 
downplayed (but, it is worth repeating, without a total rejection) testimony as a valid epistemic 
instrument, in accord with the general Greek approach. This contrasted in principle with the 
“genealogical” and consensual conception of knowledge described above, and its social value.  
Ibn Ṭufayl’s Risālat Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān and Ibn al-Nafīs’ Risālat Kāmiliyya represent, in my reading, 
two witnesses of this underlying epistemic and social tension.  
 
                                                             
 
16 See Forcada (2011). 
17 See also Rosenthal (2007). 
18 De Anima III 7-8. 




2. Self-taught knowledge 
The well-known Andalusian physician and philosopher Ibn Ṭufayl (d. 1185) developed falsafa’s 
reason-centered epistemology in his celebrated philosophical narrative treatise Risālat Ḥayy Ibn 
Yaqẓān fī asrār ḥikmat mašriqiyya (The Epistle of Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān on the secrets of Oriental wisdom), also 
known under the epistemically charged title of its Early Modern Latin translation, Philosophus 
Autodidactus (The Self-Taught Philosopher, 1671). This text has attracted significant philosophical and 
scholarly interest in both the Islamicate world and the West for a long time.19 
Ibn Ṭufayl begins his work with an introduction in form of a letter, where he explicitly presents 
the text as a philosophical allegory created by the author himself, in order to point the way to 
apprehend the highest truths. He references to the work of his predecessors, such as al-Fārābī, Ibn 
Sīnā, Ibn Bāğğa (d. 1137) and al-Ġazālī (d. 1111), assessing their philosophical significance. He declares 
that the book will present views elaborated particularly upon Ibn Sīnā’s thought.20  
The wording suggests the text to be taken as a pointer (išāra) to the path to truth, rather than a 
communication about it, which the author implies to be impossible. The intelligent reader should 
follow this path by himself in order to apprehend a glimpse of the reality that exists beyond words 
(Conrad 1996, Bürgel 1996, Kukkonen 2009).21 Ibn Ṭufayl understands the ‘taste’ of Avicennian 
epistemology as a personal process that cannot be properly “taught;” but, it appears, it may be 
“hinted at” in metaphor. 
It appears right away that, for Ibn Ṭufayl, the higher intellectual realities transcend the verbal 
world entirely, and would therefore be outside the grasp of testimonial knowledge, and, therefore, 
society. 
The book proceeds to relate a tale on the authority of some unspecified “pious forefathers” 
(salafnā ṣāliḥ)22 about an individual named Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān (The Living, Son of the Vigilant). The 
name comes from a from a philosophical tale by Ibn Sīnā equally titled Risālat Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, with 
                                                             
 
19 See among others Hourani (1956), Hasanali (1995), Conrad et al. (1996), Germann (2008), Lauri (2013), 
Kukkonen (2014).  
20 See though Hawi (1976), Gutas (2000) and Kukkonen (2008). 
21 See also Yorke (2006). 
22 These ‘ancestors’ are sometimes speculated to be identified with the Ihwān al-Ṣafā’, an intellectual circle of 
Ismailite leanings who operated in Iraq in the tenth century. They authored a series of philosophical treatises, 
collectively forming an encyclopedia of sciences; these works offer some resemblances with Ibn Tufayl’s text. 
See Kruk (1996). 
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which Ibn Ṭufayl’s work is sometimes confused by later Arabic sources (Schacht and Meyerhof 1968: 
29). 
Ḥayy is either abandoned or spontaneously generated in an otherwise uninhabited island near 
the Equator.23 Ibn Ṭufayl treats the two accounts of Ḥayy’s birth as two contrasting reports of the 
tale, a common procedure in Arabic literature, which however he does not use in the rest of the 
narrative.24 The testimonial structure is thus explicitly invoked for the descriptions of the island and 
Ḥayy's generation, and then largely abandoned in the following text. 
Raised by a doe, Ḥayy gradually becomes aware of the use of his limbs and discovers the inner 
workings of the external world around him, described in general within the frames accepted by 
Aristotelian Arabic philosophers.25 Ḥayy determines that everything around him, especially living 
beings, is well designed to fit in a well ordered, hierarchically structured whole according to a 
purposeful harmony. He notices the perfection of the celestial bodies and understands the 
incorporeality of the soul. Thus, Ḥayy deduces the existence of a Creator and understands that his 
own purpose as a rational being is to know Him as closely as possible. He deduces by himself a set of 
steps towards this knowledge, that is, according to an Aristotelian-Avicennian epistemology, towards 
the apprehension of intelligible Form. He thus elevates himself to the ineffable, non-communicable 
degree of pure contemplation (mušāhada) 26 of the incorporeal Forms and the underlying unity of all 
being, attained directly, without discursive thinking or verbal mediation. 
                                                             
 
23 The spontaneous generation process is described in some detail, giving the author the opportunity to express 
his position on some contemporary physiological discussions with significant implications. This feature of the 
tale is rather striking to the modern reader and indeed interesting. It should be noted that the possibility of 
spontaneous generation of human beings was debated by Ibn Ṭufayl’s forebears and contemporaries and is 
consistent with his interpretation of the Aristotelian-Avicennian scientific paradigm. See Kruk (1996), Richter-
Bernburg (1996), Bertolacci (2012). 
24 Malti-Douglas (1996). Alternative accounts, however, are referred later as the result of Ḥayy’s reflections on 
the eternity of creation of the world. 
25 See though Richter-Bernburg (1996). 
26 This term, used in Sufi milieus, is cognate with the Arabic word for the act of witness, šahāda. This latter word 
does not refer only to a report of eyewitness in a judicial context, but indicates the Muslim profession of faith: 
the believer accepts the basic religious tenets as personally testifying them, rather than believing them as 
implied in the corresponding Christian formula of Credo. The root Š-H-D, which forms šahāda, covers a semantic 
area roughly equivalent to the Greek μάρτυρ- (martyr-) and encompasses the notion of martyrdom; it normally 
refers more to a willingly accepted self-sacrifice for the faith rather than a suffered persecution. However, the 
root is not significantly invested with the epistemological meaning of “testimony” which is the topic of this 
article.   




At this point, Ḥayy meets another man called Asāl, who had come to his island to live as a 
hermit from a neighboring, civilized community. Asāl is fascinated by Ḥayy’s intellectual self-
elevation to contemplative experience, that he himself had been seeking. In turn, Ḥayy is made 
aware of linguistic communication and organized society. He realizes that Asāl’s people's religion (a 
thinly disguised Islam) underlies the same truths he had arrived at by himself, veiled in metaphoric 
language. He decides to join civilization to teach to Asāl’s friends the true significance of these 
metaphors, so that they can partake in the blissful contemplative state he had reached. However, 
Asāl’s people, while virtuous, only follow religious revelation with outwardly compliance. Attempts 
by Ḥayy to deepen their understanding of divine things through teaching are met with revulsion and 
bewilderment. Ḥayy realizes that shrouding truths in religious metaphor was necessary to those 
people, whose intellect is supposedly too weak to attain the truth; he sees that attempts to 
communicate them higher truths are pointless, if not dangerous. Then, he returns to his island with 
Asāl, where both end their life in blissful intellectual contemplation. 
The focal point of the treatise has been debated, but epistemology and its relationship to social 
life clearly play a central part. Many readers have felt its principal subject to be the contention that 
independent thinking can reach knowledge with no reference whatsoever to previously known 
notions, actually without teachers or guides at all (Hourani 1956). It may also show that attempts to 
relate intellectually acquired, individual knowledge into society are problematic and may require a 
specific way of expression that Ḥayy does not possess.27  
Thus, many interpreters have agreed in seeing the call for the self-sufficiency of human, 
individual reason, as opposed to society-based (and thus, word-based, although this has been rarely 
pointed out) knowledge, as a component of the core message of the treatise. 
Ḥayy’s epistemic journey is consistent with the Aristotelian epistemology of universal 
knowledge based on abstract reason, with experience from the senses as a (very important) 
preliminary step to it. It is also generally faithful to Ibn Sīnā’s notion of non-discursive knowledge, 
with a markedly mystical bent.  
On the other hand, verbal communication among individuals is not presented as an unalloyed 
epistemic failure: once Ḥayy familiarizes with language, both he and Asāl do not appear to have any 
difficulty in understanding or accepting the other’s testimony. This is somewhat striking as Ḥayy had 
no previous experience of testimony as an epistemic tool, and the matters, such as the existence of 
social life, Asāl relates to him are entirely outside his previous experience and knowledge. 
                                                             
 
27 This conclusion is argued especially by Kochin (1999), but may be also implied in Marmura (1979). 
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This should not be read as a naïve approach to testimony that takes its epistemic possibility for 
granted.28 Ḥayy may be implicitly operating under some underlying form of “acceptance principle”29 
in his communication with Asāl; but Ḥayy’s subsequent encounters with verbal communication 
present it more problematically; other people, described as irrational, question his words to the point 
of doubting his sanity. Ḥayy’s self-reliant epistemology does not pass the test of social life. At this 
point, Ḥayy resorts to deception, feigning having understood his error and exhorting the people to 
keep following the outwardly dimension of religion without further question into deeper matters, 
before leaving them and isolating himself again. While not proving to be socially effective, Ḥayy’s 
understanding of verbal communication is therefore sophisticated enough to include a form of 
“noble lie”.30 Furthermore, Hayy’s earlier epistemic process actually verifies to the reader (if not to his 
audience in the story) the truth of revealed religion.  
Ultimately, the overall epistemological position of Risālat Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān discusses and 
considers perception and reason as being much more significant than testimony; Ḥayy can be an 
archetypal figure for the “autonomous knower” implied by the Greek philosophical tradition and 
many subsequent philosophers, most notably John Locke (Adler 2012). The treatise may have been, 
indeed, available to Locke in Latin translation (Russel 1994).  
It is clear, however, that the text offers a more nuanced and sophisticated approach to 
epistemology in a social context than it appears at first sight. It represents an epistemic challenge to 
defenders of tradition in emphasizing the autonomy of reason, but it also suggests that reason alone 
is inadequate to the workings of social life.  
 
3. Epistemology as a social problem 
The renowned Syro-Egyptian physician and scholar Ibn al-Nafīs answered to some of Ibn Ṭufayl’s 
views in his Risālat Kāmiliyya, probably written around 1274 (Schacht and Meyerhof 1968: 34). 
                                                             
 
28 Aristotelian psychology does not assume a specific faculty for language, and, to my knowledge, does not 
generally see language as the bearer of any specific cognitive value. In De Anima, Aristotle appears to be taking 
grammar for granted. 
29 This principle states that “a person is entitled to accept as true something that is presented as true and that is 
intelligible to him, unless there are stronger reasons not to do so” (see Faulkner 2000). (An interesting parallel 
to this principle can be found in Kumarila’s intrinsic validity theory, according to which every cognition should 
be accepted as true unless and until contrary evidence arises. Note by the Editor). 
30 On this point, I expand and partly correct what I argued in Lauri (2013), where I followed Kochin (1999) in 
pointing out Ḥayy’s failure to convey truth adequately in a verbal form. See also Lauri (2015).  




Accounts on Ibn al-Nafīs’ life are relatively scant, but they concur to portray a well-respected 
cultivated man, praised by his contemporaries for his mastery of medicine and his literary style. He is 
remembered as a physician through his discovery of pulmonary transit of blood. His scholarly 
curriculum included the usual strong focus on language, sciences and logic as a preliminary basis for 
further knowledge that frequently characterized Medieval Islamicate scholarship in his time. He was 
also well acquainted with falsafa themes. He is credited with a vast corpus of writing, of which several 
texts have survived. While he mainly wrote about medical subjects, his expertise was, as common in 
his time, wide-ranging, and his production includes treatises on logic, ḥadīṯ study and Arabic 
grammar, most of which lost (Schacht and Meyerhof 1968: 22 ff.). 
In the introductory lines of Risālat Kāmiliyya, Ibn al-Nafīs declares that his purpose is “to relate 
[iqtiṣāṣ, from iqtaṣṣa ‘tell,’ ‘narrate’] what Fāḍil bin Nāṭiq [an ominous name, meaning “the Virtuous, 
son of the Rational” 31 ] transmitted [ḏakara] from the man called Kāmil [meaning “Perfect”] 
concerning [more literally: “on what relates to”] the life-story of the Prophet and the ordinances of 
religious law.”32 The life-story of the Prophet was the topic of the genre of Sīra Nabawiyya (Prophetic 
Biography), which usually relied on aḫbār reported to that effect. “The ordinances of religious law” 
(al-sunan al-šar‘iyya) also are treated by a very large corpus of legal writing in Islam. However, these 
traditional matters are associated with other topics and presented in a strikingly original way in 
Risālat Kāmiliyya. The book is divided into four parts. 
In the first part, the basic plot of Risālat Kāmiliyya resembles Risālat Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān very closely. 
“The man called Kāmil,” as he is consistently called through the text, is spontaneously generated in a 
desert island, where he comes to know the material world by deduction from sensible experience, 
broadly mirroring, with considerably less detail, Ḥayy’s discoveries. His solitary reflection leads him 
to the understanding of the existence of a Creator, on the basis of the Avicennian argument ex 
contingentia.33 Kāmil then wants to know how to honor and serve this Creator. At this point, however, 
Risālat Kāmiliyya dramatically diverges from Ibn Ṭufayl’s narrative: as noted by Fancy (2010), Kāmil 
does not come to fulfill his desire to know about God’s will in isolation. A ship wrecks on his island; he 
meets the crew and learns from them aspects of civilized life such as language, cooking and clothing. 
                                                             
 
31 As rendered by Mahdi (1970). 
32 Schacht and Meyerhof (1968: 38); text in square brackets is mine. I chose to highlight the Arabic lexicon 
pointing to testimony and transmission. 
33 For the Avicennian arguments for the existence of God, see Marmura (1980) and Wisnovsky (2005). 
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Kāmil agrees to leave his island with them to live in society, whose necessity he comes to know 
(‘alima).  
Only then, from the second part of the book, Kāmil goes on applying his process of knowledge 
through deduction, on the basis of empirical data, to the knowledge of God, the Prophet, Islamic law 
and Islamic history. The necessity of Prophecy and the life-story of the last of the Prophets 
(Muḥammad, although he is not generally referred to by name) are discussed in the second part. In 
the third, the basic legal ordinances established by Islamic Law, traced to the Prophet, are explained 
through the same epistemic process. The fourth part discusses Islamic history after the death of the 
Prophet, including events of the time of Ibn al-Nafīs like the Mongol invasion, as well as Islamic 
eschatology, closing the text with detail on how bodily resurrection will occur. Only the first part 
details Kāmil’s spontaneous generation, solitary inquiry and initial meeting with other humans. 
Kāmil’s rational findings display general accord (although not total accord) with religious views as 
presented by preceding and contemporary tradition.34 The original elements lie mostly in the way 
these matters and discussions are presented in a story of seemingly solitary learning. Then, the actual 
topic of the treatise appears to be, not the life of the Prophet in itself, but the way Kāmil comes to 
know it and everything else.  
This is indeed emphasized in the titles of single chapters and sections, several of which include 
variations of “how the one called Kāmil came to know” (ta‘arrafa or related expressions) while other 
section titles (mainly the ones referring specific features of the life-story of the Prophet) simply state 
the topic of the reflection. Many sections however begin reiterating that their content is the product 
of Kāmil’s thinking, with recurring expressions like “then the one called Kāmil reflected upon 
(tafakkara fī).” 
Transmission, and language at large, are not featured explicitly as modes of knowledge available 
for Kāmil, except for the passing mention of him learning the language of the ship’s people to a good 
degree (Schacht and Meyerhof 1968: 45). Kāmil explicitly arrives at the notion that testimony can be a 
sound epistemological basis for socially accepted knowledge; but he is never described to make any 
epistemic use of it himself, except for practicalities: he is taught the use of clothes and cooking by 
others, in contrast with Ḥayy, who devises both by himself. Kāmil is never mentioned being taught 
such inherently testimony-based subjects as history or law, which make up the vast majority of his 
reflection. 
                                                             
 
34 See detailed discussion in Fancy (2006, chapters 2 and 3).  




Nevertheless, testimony occupies an in important place in the epistemic toolkit of Ibn al-Nafīs’ 
book. As quoted above, the story begins with its “isnād,” presenting itself as reported on the authority 
of one Fāḍil Ibn Nāṭiq, of which however nothing is said at all, providing no instrument of extrinsic 
validation except for the meaning of his name. Fāḍil Ibn Nāṭiq is also the title by which the tale is 
recorded by Ibn al-Nafīs’ subsequent biographers, in explicit contrastive parallel with Ḥayy Ibn 
Yaqẓān (which those biographers attribute to Ibn Sīnā). Each of the four parts of Risālat Kāmiliyya also 
starts with the opening formula qāla Fadil bin Nāṭiq, ‘Fāḍil Ibn Nāṭiq said,’ thus restating his epistemic 
responsibility. 
As noted, Risālat Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān as well is presented as a report, to a point; but Ibn al-Nafīs 
seems more consistently committed to this framing, mentioning its “source” throughout instead of 
some unspecified “forefathers” at the beginning. This fictional presentation device is complementary 
to the picture of Ḥayy’s and Kāmil’s knowledge as essentially (although not entirely) perceptive and 
intellectual (but not explicitly syllogistic) in nature. Testimony is a “thin veil,” a cover under which 
quotes from sources known to the readership such as Qur’anic quotations (more common in Risālat 
Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān) or the works of Ibn Sīnā (in Risālat Kāmiliyya) can be embedded.  
The apparent purpose of Risālat Kāmiliyya would then appear to be a treatment of “traditional” 
sciences like history and law as rationally deducible into a frame that gives them validity 
independent from tradition, as products of inner workings of Kāmil’s mind, validating transmitted 
truth through rational means.  
The same epistemic process we have seen at work in Risālat Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān would be applied 
here to orthodox tenets, and, critically, social norms. This is the reading that Schacht and Meyerhof 
offer in their introduction to the critical edition and abridged translation of the text, justifying the 
title of Theologus Autodidactus they chose, implying it as counterpart to Ibn Ṭufayl’s Philosophus 
Autodidactus.  
The overall epistemic stance that emerges, though, appears puzzling. It has been re-examined 
recently by Nahyan Fancy. Fancy refutes Schacht’s and Meyerhof’s view of Risālat Kāmiliyya as a 
defense of “traditional” conclusions through rationalistic epistemology (Fancy 2010); rather, he reads 
it as a defense of the rationality of both traditional conclusions and traditionalist epistemology 
against the perceived challenge posed by falsafa, and particularly by Ibn Ṭufayl’s radically 
autonomous, non-social knower.  
It should be observed, however, that, Ibn Ṭufayl’s work may be less radical than his Early 
Modern readership took him to be, as suggested above. 
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Fancy points to the mentions of specific names of historical or geographical relevance that 
would have made no sense if Kāmil’s consideration of society, history and law had been entirely 
deductive and inferential. The presence of such concrete references had puzzled the editors of the 
treatise, who considered it slips on the author’s part that undermine the self-consistency of Ibn al-
Nafīs’ supposed rationalist defense of dogma (Schacht and Meyerhof 1968: 35). In Fancy’s analysis, 
these show that Kāmil's bases his reflection, after his meeting with the ship crew, on testimony, 
which he subsequently rationalizes: a procedure akin to what Aristotelian epistemology, as presented 
by the Arabic tradition, accepts in fields where particulars play an important part, such as medicine. 
We are not seeing individual intellectual inference in isolation: the limits, not the powers, of self-
sufficient individual reason are what the treatise would highlight. 
I agree, in general, with Fancy’s assessment of the testimonial nature of historical and 
geographical references in the text. This reading makes justice of Ibn al-Nafīs’ rigorous thinking, 
rather than positing widespread and unexplainable sloppiness in his core argument. Since Kāmil 
displays knowledge of particular instances of events and places, clearly outside his direct experiential 
access, he cannot be an entirely self-taught knower like the one Ḥayy is presumed to be, whose 
epistemic concerns mostly regard universal Forms.35 Testimony plays, implicitly, a much larger role 
in Risālat Kāmiliyya than it would seem at first. 
In partial contrast to Fancy’s “traditionalist” interpretation, though, I would note that the 
language used by Ibn al-Nafīs emphasizes Kāmil’s epistemic isolation very markedly, even after his 
socializing experience. The common expression is “Kāmil reflected [tafakkara] about […] and said to 
himself [qāla fī nafsihi]” with variations. The specific chains of historical events and legal dispositions 
he reasons about are thus shown to conform an internal, deducible line of development in which they 
follow necessarily from some basic premises established by reasoning (the existence of a Creator) and 
experience/perception (the existence of society). Some testimonial data, such as the mentioned place 
names, operate likewise as secondary premises (alongside experiential data), and knowledge at large 
would be impossible without them, but they alone do not warrant a wholesale defense of 
“traditionalist” epistemology, although they do challenge the self-sufficiency of reason.  
The question of what Risālat Kāmiliyya actually intends to demonstrate remains problematic. 
This paper cannot offer a final answer on this, for which deeper study would be necessary. It is clear 
that epistemology is a central concern of the treatise. Like Risālat Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, it intends to 
                                                             
 
35 Nevertheless, particular knowledge comes to Ḥayy through perception and, in the case of the specifics of 
religious law, through Asāl’s testimony.  




support some form of balance between rationalistic-inferential and traditional-testimonial epistemic 
resources, validating each other. The balance is, however, different in the two cases, in accord with 
the difference in the primary subject matters of the relevant knowledge itself.  
It is also clear that Risālat Kāmiliyya is in a close, but tense relationship with Risālat Ḥayy Ibn 
Yaqẓān and that the similarities between the two plots should be understood as marking the 
numerous theoretical differences between their authors. Fancy’s compelling arguments that Kāmil is 
not, as it may appear at first, self-taught in the same integral way Ḥayy is, show that these 
differences extend into the respective epistemological conceptions, as well as conclusions.   
I suggest that Ibn al-Nafīs’ choice to focus on an inference-driven presentation of inherently 
testimonial subjects such as history and law ultimately illustrates the social and political nature of his 
tension with Ibn Ṭufayl’s philosophy, from which Ibn al-Nafīs’ implicit critique of self-teaching 
stems. 
In philosophical epistemology, as noted, subjects of such particular knowledge as history cannot 
be easily accommodated, while Ibn al-Nafīs regards this kind of knowledge of particular facts and 
events as essential.  
Conversely, in illustrating that the religious corpus of testimony is in accord with reason, he 
does not agree entirely with the traditionalist scholars who stood for a more purely genealogical 
conception of knowledge. This stance parallels Ibn al-Nafīs’ relatively unusual call for rational 
examination in his work on the study of the ḥadīṯ, where he contends that rational analysis of matn 
should play a role in their assessment alongside the usual analysis of isnād. He thus moves away from 
the extrinsic epistemology dominating that field (Fancy 2006: 57-72). 
In my opinion, Ibn al-Nafīs opposes Ḥayy’s isolation, rather than his rational approach; the 
treatise appears to imply that knowledge is inherently, necessarily social in nature and aims, as it 
offers a rational understanding of society, law and history. Once this social nature is accepted, 
independent rational activity can be accommodated in an unproblematic way; its conclusion may 
converge with what is transmitted through socially validated testimony, as in reported historical and 
legal knowledge based on testimony.  
As I discuss elsewhere, the tension between individual and society is a deep driving factor of 
Medieval Arabic philosophy that operates on the epistemic and political levels alike (Lauri 2015). 
It is apparent that Risālat Kāmiliyya has a political dimension. Its fourth and last part describes 
what will happen after the Prophet's death, that is, Islamic history and eschatology. Kāmil’s reflection 
focuses on three aspects: the conflict among early Muslims for the caliphate, the events of his own 
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age marked by the Mongol irruption and successful Mamlūk resistance against them, and the 
temporal end of the world with the final resurrection of the bodies. 
The Mongol invasion was felt as a devastating blow to the Islamic community. Mongols were 
associated with the apocalyptic hordes of Gog and Magog; their sack of Baghdad destroyed the last 
remnants of the Abbasid Caliphate, and with it, a significant symbolic focus for Sunnis, although one 
largely deprived of actual political power. The Eastern half of the Islamicate world went for some 
decades under the infidel rule of the Mongol Ilkhanids, until they converted to Islam. 
Ibn al-Nafīs offers a rational understanding of these deeply worrying events in terms of 
providential historical necessity, inspired by Egyptian apocalyptic literature (Kruk 1995). In Fancy’s 
reading, Kāmil would have known of the invasions testimonially and further proceeded to make sense 
of it inferentially. However, the wording of the text, in referring to actual historical events, is careful 
to keep their description abstract and general, and to stress that it is presenting Kāmil’s thought 
process. Thus, in my reading, the text does not support Fancy’s interpretation, which, in my opinion, 
would weaken the argument of the necessary nature of history.  
Ibn al-Nafīs proceeds to illustrate how Muslim resistance to the Mongols is likewise a rational 
necessity. Necessarily, Kāmil thinks, a Muslim leader will emerge to stop the Mongol invasion.  
His detailed description of this leader identifies the famous Mamlūk ruler Baybars, who had 
actually defeated the Mongols at ‘Ayn Ğalūt in 1260; true to the presentation of Kāmil’s knowledge as 
non-testimonial, Ibn al-Nafīs does not name him (Schacht and Meyerhof 1968: 34). The details given 
in the text strongly suggest that Ibn al-Nafīs knew Baybars personally, and it has been proposed, but 
not proven, that he could have been his court physician (Schacht and Meyerhof 1968: 34, Fancy 2006: 
45-46). 
The text then can be understood, among other things, as a call to Muslims to rally around the 
Mamlūk rule, and Sunni orthodoxy, grounded in a sophisticated epistemology where, paradoxically, 
testimony finds its way through attempts at validating means of knowledge supposedly independent 
of it, reinforcing the social nature of knowledge. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In Western teaching traditions, Jewish and Islamic philosophies are often detached from the Western 
one and lumped together as “Oriental” philosophy, with the historically inaccurate inclusion of 




Indian philosophy and Chinese traditions36 of thought into the same category. These misconceptions 
contributed making the understanding of Islamic philosophy at large problematic. A long standing 
point of contention has been how to relate a tradition of thought which painted itself as based on 
independent, primarily not genealogical inquiry to the context of a culture where transmitted word 
represents the basis of knowledge. This contrast has led several scholars to see philosophy as only 
superficially linked to ‘Islamic culture.’37 
This epistemic opposition should be nuanced, at the very least, among other things, based on the 
notes above. While Ibn al-Nafīs adopts the hegemonic views shared by Sunni scholars of his time, he 
originally adapts epistemic preoccupations and philosophical strategies of knowledge that 
characterized falsafa. He found a narrative way to found the pillars of his world’s “traditional” 
sciences of social significance, such as history and law, on a non-social basis; on the other hand, he 
shows purely self-relying reason to be insufficient, bringing it again to its societal and testimonial 
dimensions. 
It may be that Ibn al-Nafīs realized that he needed to show epistemic isolation to demonstrate 
the social nature of knowledge. Testimony operates, according to him, in conjunction with 
independent reason in a shared epistemic space. In an original way, Risālat Kāmiliyya addresses what, 
in another context, Leonardo Capezzone has called “the political problem of knowledge in the city.”38 
I conclude in the cooperative spirit of the project of which this article is part. In showing, 
through fictional epistemic isolation, the social character of knowledge, Ibn al-Nafīs would have 
probably shared our conviction of the inherently collaborative nature of scholarly activity. 
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